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Some terrorist acts are meant to communicate something beyond the violence they 
cause. They are a form of political communication that should be studied as such. To 
identify the acts we consider politically communicative, we develop a typology of 
primary objectives that ranges from strategic goals to such communicative statements 
as moral condemnation. We examine why, as a form of political communication, terrorist 
acts typically fail. Terrorism fails as political communication because it is violent; 
because targeted audiences often have little prior awareness of the group’s grievances; 
because it is sometimes a complex communication; and because governments and 
media frame issues in a way that sidelines the act’s communicative content. In 
promoting a better understanding of the message, and why it fails, we hope to make 
this component of terrorism a more robust subject of study for political communication 
scholars. 
 
Keywords: terrorism, political communication, communication failure, speech acts, 
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Introduction 
 
Orthodox terrorism studies generally focus on the psychological or strategic motivations behind 
terrorism while the communicative content of any particular terrorist act is ignored. Thus, terrorism is 
regarded as principally a strategic act with an emphasis on what speech act theory (Searle, 1969) would 
call its perlocutionary effects. Speech act theory calls the intended point of a message the illocutionary 
act, the actual impact on the “receiver” is the perlocutionary effect; the intention and the effect are not 
always aligned.  
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The emphasis on terrorism’s effects has prevailed in parts of communication as well, particularly 
among those who study how terrorists use mass media to accomplish their instrumental ends. Arguably, 
however, insofar as an act is terrorist, it has some communicative content. Therefore, some sociologists 
(Goodwin, 2006; Tilly, 2004), communication scholars (Hadis, 2007), and rhetoricians (Windt, 2006) have 
been attentive to the communicative aspects of terrorism, particularly emphasizing audience. What is 
striking in these treatments, however, is that they generally stop short of identifying any message content 
meant to be conveyed through the act.  
 
In this article, we propose to build on these prior communication analyses and take them one 
step further. First, we want to emphasize that acts of terrorism are always political and as such always 
embedded with some communicative content. In short, whereas illocutionary acts are ordinarily 
understood as ways of doing things with words (Searle, 1969), as a communicative act, terrorism 
represents the reverse case: saying something by doing something. Thus, we seek to complete the picture 
toward which the prior analyses point. We seek to draw out explicitly what the communicative content is. 
To that end, we develop a typology of primary objectives that ranges in intentionality from mere 
instrumentality to the morally communicative. We want to move beyond an objectivist interpretation of 
terrorism, which exclusively understands it by its origins and targets, as opposed to the illocutionary acts 
it sometimes performs.  
 
Applying speech act theory to terrorist acts can raise a question of intentionality. Manifest 
intentions, however, are generally decipherable from context alone (Blum & McHugh, 1971; Davidson, 
1963; Geertz, 1973; Rubinstein, 1977). When it comes to the most communicative of terrorist acts, we 
can also look at avowals—at what documented terrorists say they were trying to communicate.  
 
We argue that an approach that focuses on the act, not the actor, can bring to light insights 
about terrorism that are otherwise missed. Why, for example, terrorist groups focus on instrumental as 
opposed to communicative forms of terrorism can be explained in terms of the group’s contextual 
objectives. We also explain why, when a terrorist act is intended as a form of political communication, it is 
likely to fail. Here we draw from rhetoricians of social protest to explain that the failure of terrorism is akin 
to what Windt (2006) calls the failure of diatribe: One does not convince an audience when one insults 
and berates, let alone perpetrates physical harm against them. 
 
Communicative Action 
 
One distinction we are trying to make is between terrorist acts that are more instrumental and 
terrorist acts that are more communicative. Instrumental acts may communicate different meanings to 
different audiences, without any of those meanings necessarily being an intended communication. On the 
other hand, it can sometimes happen that an instrumental goal of a terrorist act is precisely to 
communicate some meaning to some audience. 
 
Habermas (1981) makes a well-known distinction between strategic and communicative action 
that is helpful in understanding this differentiation, but one that needs to be qualified. For Habermas, 
strategic action is a subset of instrumental action (Bolton, 2005). Instrumental action is action intended to 
1122 Ashley Pattwell, Tyson Mitman & Douglas Porpora International Journal of Communication 9(2015) 
achieve a pragmatic goal. Thus, instrumental action follows a means-ends rationality—that is, a rationality 
concerned with the most efficient means or path to a chosen end. Not all instrumental action involves 
other people. Much of it, in fact, involves navigating our own individual ways through the physical world. 
Strategic action is that subset of instrumental action where the chosen goals concern other people and 
their reactions. 
 
In contrast, communicative action, according to Habermas, intends to achieve mutual 
understanding. Thus, in contrast to strategic action narrowly, or even instrumental action more generally, 
communicative action does not follow a means-ends rationality. Instead, it encompasses an epistemic 
rationality of rhetoric and persuasion that follows what Habermas calls a universal pragmatics. 
 
In the case of terrorism, we do think it useful to distinguish between strategic and communicative 
action, but, as already noted, the distinction is not always as straightforward as Habermas suggests. After 
all, achieving understanding with one’s enemy may be a step in one’s larger strategy. In such case, 
communicative action is not the end in itself that Habermas posits, but rather a means to some more 
ultimate end.  
 
Thus, in contrast to Habermas, we want to allow the possibility of communication also as a 
means to an end and not exclusively as an end in itself. In that case, it might be a terrorist’s goal to right 
some wrong, in part, by getting an enemy to realize the enormity of the wrong via a terrorist act. 
Similarly, we do not want to preclude the alternate possibility that terrorist action might be largely 
instrumental, concerned, for example, with disrupting governability.  
 
In the case of terrorism as a communicative act, can we really tell the intention from the act 
itself? Yes and no. Although some, like Durkheim (1951), make it seem that inferring the intentions of 
others is a great mystery, they overlook the hierarchy of intentions in all action. It may be that someone’s 
ultimate intention in some act eludes us, but we generally know from the context what the person’s 
surface intentions are. In fact, being social animals, it could not be otherwise. Our cooperative efforts 
could not succeed if we could not depend on our knowledge of how each party to an enterprise is likely to 
perform. We could not even identify behavior as aggression if we could not infer intentionality. And, in 
fact, even to label an act as terrorism already infers intent. On the other hand, the meaning of 
communicative terrorist acts is not always obvious, which is why terrorists themselves in addition often 
actually say what their intended meaning was. As we will go on to argue, it is sometimes the discord 
between the communicative content of acts and the accompanying rhetorical justification that causes 
terrorism to fail as political communication.  
 
As noted in the introduction, the focus on terrorism even among communication scholars has 
been on the perlocutionary as opposed to the illocutionary force of terrorist acts. The distinction between 
perlocutionary and illocutionary acts goes back to Austin’s (1975) articulation and Searle’s (1969) 
popularization of speech act theory. According to speech act theory, speech acts can be understood as 
having three analytically separate levels of action. The locutionary act is the utterance itself in whatever 
language it is uttered. The illocutionary act is the kind of speech act performed thereby, such as stating, 
requesting, commanding, condemning, and so forth. The perlocutionary act is the effect of such 
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illocutionary acts on their audience(s): understanding, compiling, obeying, repenting, and so forth. It is 
the illocutionary act that describes or identifies an actual doing—a doing that is done with words.  
 
Our argument in this article is that illocutionary and perlocutionary force can be applied as a 
framework to analyze the communicative content of terrorist acts. The distinction between the act 
performed and the effect it has still holds if the communication is carried through action. A terrorist act, 
for example, may be meant to signal a condemnation—the illocutionary force of the act. The 
perlocutionary force, the effect of the act, however, might range from the repentance the act sought to 
resentment, indignation, or outrage that were not its intended results. To focus only on the perlocutionary 
effect, as so much research does, is to neglect the potentially informative illocutionary content. 
 
The Missing Message 
 
The literature’s neglect of illocutionary force begins at the level of definitions. Although there 
certainly is no consensus on what terrorism is (Goodwin, 2006), where terrorism is not defined purely in 
terms of its violent means (Black, 2004; Hoffman, 1998; Tilly, 2004; U.S. State Department, 2004), it 
tends to be defined in terms of its effect or perlocutionary force (e.g., Bergesen & Lizardo, 2004; Ganor, 
1998). According to Turk (1982), for example, terrorism is “designed to deter political opposition by 
maximizing fear” (p. 119). Carr (2003) similarly defines terrorism as a kind of “warfare deliberately waged 
against civilians with the purpose of destroying their will” (p. 6). Deterring opposition, maximizing fear, 
and destroying civilian will are perlocuationary effects that can be accomplished without communicative 
content.  
 
The apparent inability to reach a consensus definition of terrorism should not deter us. Rather, it 
is possible to work without a definition, employing instead paradigm cases. As Putnam (1973) argued in 
the case of natural kinds, we often understand meaning not via definitions, but by paradigm examples to 
which specific cases come close. Casuistry works on the same paradigmatic principle (Jonsen & Toulmin, 
1988). Wittgenstein (1953) argued similarly that, in the case of practices such as games, we understand 
what we are talking about not by specification of necessary and sufficient criteria but by appeal to 
paradigms that share, at most, family resemblances. Similarly, there are paradigmatic acts that the vast 
majority of people agrees are terrorism, even if no one can formulate a generally acceptable definition of 
the term. 
 
The lack of research on illocutionary content continues beyond definitions. Thus, even when the 
literature calls attention to terrorism’s illocutionary force, it overlooks what the illocutionary content is. 
Consider, for example, one of the most recent and best treatments of the rhetoric and symbolism of 
terrorism, Tuman’s (2010) Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism. Both the title 
and subtitle lead us to expect something about the communicative content of terrorist acts. Tuman also 
dedicates two chapters to terrorism as a “communication process with rhetorical dimensions.” He has a 
sophisticated take on the communicative process operating in connection with terrorism that we think is 
correct. His argument is that meaning is embedded in acts of terrorism, just as it is in all acts. Its 
symbolic content places it within a discursive framework, but its meaning is always mediated by “official 
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discourse with particular emphasis on the public address of government leaders or that of terrorists” (p. 
42). 
It is, however, on the government-mediated interpretation of terrorist acts that Tuman focuses, 
which he argues allows the terrorists’ intended meaning to slip away. We agree that, through public 
discourse and rhetorical construction of terrorism, the original meaning easily gets lost. But that very 
point implies that there is something that does get lost—the terrorists’ intended meaning of the act. 
Tuman neglects to tell us what that is. 
 
Mohsen (1987) likewise recognizes a communicative element in terrorism, which he calls “the 
rhetorical use of violence” (p. 56). For Mohsen, terrorism is an attempt on the part of terrorists to 
communicate and persuade. He goes on to write, “terrorism could be defined as the process of delivering 
a message through the use of symbolic acts, in the form of violence, to create a change on the part of 
receiver’s political behavior” (p. 57). Mohsen’s emphasis on change, however, returns to a perlocutionary 
focus. We certainly agree that terrorism is often a message delivered by symbolic acts, but Mohsen again 
does not tell us what the message is. 
 
Crelinsten (2002) goes so far as to speak of terrorist violence as language born of asymmetrical 
power relations.  
 
When we say that violence is the language of the inarticulate, what we mean is that 
violence is a form of communication used by those who cannot express what they feel in 
words or written tracts and publications, so they “act it out” in violent ways. So, violence 
by the state or non-state actor can be conceived as a form of communication that 
coexists with other forms of communication, sometimes used in concert with them and 
sometimes used in their stead. (p. 77)  
 
Yet, for all his emphasis on terrorism as a form of communication, Crelinsten still ends with a focus other 
than the illocutionary force of the acts. In particular, he shifts his attention to how terrorism interacts with 
other forms of social and political communication and away from what is specifically being communicated 
through a terrorist act.  
 
In other ways as well, the attention of communication scholars has been diverted from the 
messages that terrorists are trying to convey. Much communication scholarship has focused on the way in 
which the media, by publicizing terrorist acts, have become instrumental to the terrorists’ ends 
(Bockstette, 2009; Gerbner & Signorielli, 1988; Picard, 1993). Schmid and de Graaf (1982) focus on 
media treatment and say that terrorists choose soft targets with the intention of using the media to 
achieve publicity.  
 
This choice of soft targets is a result of the fact that today’s rulers are often so well 
protected that other victims have to be chosen. In a military sense, this type of 
terrorism is an indirect strategy. But that, in our view, is not the main reason why 
innocent people are victimized. The reason is rather that, the voice of innocent people is 
sometimes capable of producing a stronger echo among the population. . . . The point 
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we wish to make is that the choice of victims made by insurgent terrorists is in the first 
instance a function of their publicity value, of their communication potential. (p. 179) 
 
The suggestion of Schmid and de Graaf is that publicity and public relations are the primary ends of 
terrorism. These ends may well be important to terrorists. They are, however, perlocutionary, 
instrumental effects rather than any particular communicative content. 
 
Nacos (2007) argues similarly that, intentionally or not, the media lend a certain legitimacy to 
terrorists just by covering them. According to her, terrorists pursue four “very specific media-dependent 
objectives” (p. 20). They want “the attention and awareness of various audiences”; “recognition of their 
motives”; “respect and sympathy”; and status as a political player to be reckoned with (p. 20). 
 
With regard to recognition of motives, Nacos begins to approach illocutionary content. Nacos says 
the terrorists want their targets to ask, “Why did they attack us?” That question in itself is admittedly still 
a perlocutionary effect, but it is at least a perlocutionary effect of a linguistic nature. With such a question 
in play, we have the beginnings of a conversation. 
 
With Laqueur (1977), too, we begin to get communicative content. Specifically, Laqueur argues 
that terrorists are seeking to demonstrate something, a demonstration being an illocutionary act. To effect 
such demonstration, Laqueur argues, terrorists attack targets of maximum symbolic value.  
 
The symbols of state are particularly important, but perhaps even more are those 
referring to the normative structures and relationships that constitute the supporting 
framework of society. By showing the weakness of this framework, the insurgents 
demonstrate not only their own strength and the weakness of the incumbents but also 
the inability of the society to provide support for its members in a time of crisis. (p. 14) 
 
According to Laqueur, then, terrorist acts signal the weakness of a dominant group’s institutions and their 
inability to protect group members while simultaneously signaling the strength of the terrorists.  
 
Taking a different approach, Hadis (2007) also is concerned with terrorism’s communicative 
content. For Hadis, however, that content is directed primarily toward in-group members. Specifically, 
Hadis argues, terrorism serves to demonstrate the power of the terrorist group to its constituency, and 
thereby to form and reinforce the in-group mythology. In relation to the out-group, however, Hadis 
continues to leave terrorism with its perlocutionary effects, forcing “wrongdoers” to change their ways.  
 
It is with Richardson (2006) that we finally hear of terrorism as a fully illocutionary act. Along 
with recognition and renown (perlocutionary effects), Richardson speaks of terrorism as often embodying 
revenge. Revenge is an illocutionary act with a definite but complex meaning: It implies that a harm has 
been perpetrated; that the harm was morally wrong; and by the vengeful act, justice is being served.  
 
Goodwin (2006) takes us one step further with his theory of “categorical terrorism.” By 
categorical terrorism Goodwin means terrorism targeted against categories of people “without regard to 
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their individual identities or roles” (p. 231). At the same time, he points out that terrorists do not 
“indiscriminately target just any civilians or noncombatants” (p. 236); instead, they attack what Goodwin 
calls “complicitous civilians,” who the terrorists think share some responsibility for their government’s 
actions. Goodwin acknowledges that who these complicitous civilians are is a matter of complex social 
judgment. Thus, he says, if a terrorist group considers the United States a representative democracy, it 
might consider all U.S. citizens to be complicitous in the wrongs perpetrated against those the terrorists 
represent. Alternatively, if the United States is not regarded as fully democratic, the complicitous might be 
narrowed to just the more affluent and influential in society.  
 
From there, Goodwin departs from any concern with message to explore the costs and benefits of 
categorical terrorism. His focus on complicity forcefully suggests a definite illocutionary act: 
condemnation. The direct perlocutionary effect of that condemnation is to communicate to otherwise 
complacent civilians their complicity in the wrong being condemned. Such condemnation we regard as the 
most meaningful content a terrorist act can convey. 
 
Terrorism’s Communicative Content 
 
If at least some terrorist acts are intentionally communicative, then there must be concepts or 
ideas that a group wishes to convey—a core message content planned in advance, woven into the tactics 
used, and aimed at particular audiences (Rada, 1985; Richards, 2004). In viewing some terrorist acts as 
intentionally communicative, we suggest that certain terrorist acts have the express purpose of 
communicating some core message content. In this section, we are interested in what that message 
content may be. As we turn to examples of terrorist acts, we will use both the act itself and in some cases 
the accompanying rhetoric of terrorist actors to contextualize the illocutionary content.  
 
To better disentangle communicative and noncommunicative terrorist motives, we introduce a 
typology for a general interpretation of terrorism that encompasses a range of both strategic and 
communicative objectives. We do not suggest that these objectives are mutually exclusive; one and the 
same terrorist act, as we demonstrate below, can serve both strategic and communicative objectives.  
 
We present the typology in Figure 1; it is in the form of a circle to avoid the impression that 
these categories are in some way cumulative. 
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Figure 1. Primary objectives of terrorist acts. 
 
 
Strategic Objectives 
 
It is possible that some terrorist acts are motivated primarily by instrumental or strategic 
objectives. Even they, however, to the extent that they are terroristic, are executed in a way that 
communicates some symbolic content. Two immediate examples are the Irgun’s bombing of the King 
David Hotel in 1946 and the kidnapping of Israeli athletes by Black September at the 1972 Olympics in 
Munich. Although the Irgun bombing followed a British raid on the Jewish Agency, the primary motive of 
the attack was not revenge but the strategic destruction of the British Mandate office, housed in one wing 
of the King David Hotel. Although considerable casualties resulted, terror as such seems not to have been 
the Irgun’s intent. In fact, given the Irgun’s claim to have issued a warning to evacuate the hotel, it 
seems clear that destruction, not terror, was the intent. At the same time, however, the bombing was an 
important blow against one of the most important symbols of British occupation. Therefore, in addition to 
being strategic, it also falls within the category of announcement, denunciation, and demonstration. 
 
Similarly, terror may not have been what primarily motivated Black September, a Palestinian 
paramilitary group, to take Israeli athletes hostage at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. The primary 
motive may have been to work out a quid pro quo release of Palestinian prisoners. Such an objective 
could have been instrumental, or purely perlocutionary. Still, why select the Olympic Games, that 
grandest of international spectacles? Surely communicative motives were present here as well: public 
demonstration of power and the denunciation of Israel and its policies. So again, in that case, the act 
would fit the more communicative category of announcement, denunciation, and demonstration. 
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Maintaining or Disrupting Governability 
 
Although still primarily instrumental, acts that create states of ungovernability also carry a 
degree of discursiveness. As noted in the Schmid and de Graaf (1982) passage quoted earlier, by 
disrupting the established order, these acts convey to the existing or occupying government its inability to 
maintain control and simultaneously communicate to the citizenry a lack of governmental protection. 
Historically, the iconic form this disruption has taken is the improvised explosive device (IED). The first 
recorded instance of an IED was a car bomb that exploded on September 16, 1920. It was planted in a 
horse-drawn carriage on Wall Street by Italian American anarchists under the leadership of Luigi Galleani. 
The intention was to disrupt both the civil and economic order associated with the capitalist system. The 
Stern gang in British-occupied Palestine also used car bombing to create a state of ungovernability. On 
January 12, 1947, for example, Stern gang members in Haifa drove a truck loaded with explosives into a 
British police station.  
 
The very term IED was coined by the British in the 1970s to refer to what is perhaps the most 
famous use of the devices by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). Following the Bloody Sunday 
firing by British soldiers on unarmed Northern Irish protestors, the Provisional IRA initially used IEDs to 
disrupt British rule. The explicit strategy is stated in their 1977 training manual, The Green Book. 
 
The strategy is a war of attrition against enemy personnel which is aimed at causing as 
many casualties and deaths as possible so as to create a demand from their people at 
home for their withdrawal…To make the Six Counties as at present and for the past 
several years un-governable except by colonial military rule. (Irish Republican Army, 
1977; see Wikipedia, 2015, para. 37) 
 
The IRA purportedly taught the use of IEDs to Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Murphy, 
2005), who in turn had at least a knowledge exchange with the Taliban. For their part, the Taliban have 
also used roadside bombs, mines, and other IEDs to make parts of Afghanistan ungovernable.  
 
Climate of Fear 
 
Although still a method of maintaining or disrupting governability, the use of terrorism to create a 
climate of fear (see Barbalet, 1995) is important and singular enough to deserve its own section, 
particularly because it is the motivation we most commonly associate with terrorism. The concept of a 
climate of fear belongs to a whole category of phenomena known as emotional climates (De Rivera & 
Páez, 2007). Emotional climates “refer to predominant collective emotions perceived as shared by 
members of social groups, such as national, communities, or ethnic minorities” (Páez, Espinosa, & 
Bobowik, 2012, p. 113). As the designation implies, a climate of fear refers to a collective sense of 
prevailing threat or danger in a population or subpopulation. Fomenting a climate of fear can be used to 
destabilize a government, as in the case of the World War II terror bombings. Although indiscriminate 
strategic bombing was utilized by both Ally and Axis forces, beginning with the German Luftwaffe assault 
on Poland, the function on both sides was to destroy not only infrastructure but citizen morale (Parker, 
2005). The Stern gang likewise did more than just try to disrupt British governance; it also attempted to 
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create a climate of fear among Palestinians. For example, it conducted assassinations, issued death 
threats, and bombed trains. It was also a party to the massacre at the Palestinian village of Dir Yassin.  
 
Conversely, a climate of fear also can be an instrument of state terror, used to preserve 
governability. Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, the Shah of Iran, and military juntas throughout Latin 
America have all resorted to torture, disappearances, and on-site killings of civilians to repress opposition 
through fear. In some cases, as in the near-genocidal counterinsurgency during El Salvador’s civil war, the 
communicative content of the intended fear was emphasized by carving crosses on the faces and breasts 
of those espousing Catholic liberation theology (Porpora, 1980). More recent cases include the desperate 
targeting of civilians by Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and Bashar al-Assad in Syria. 
 
Announcement, Denunciation, and Demonstration 
 
The previous section described how terrorism can signal denunciation of an enemy. It can also be 
a strategic objective for a terrorist group to announce its existence and its cause, perhaps also 
demonstrating its ability to be a problem for the targeted society. Announcement and demonstration are 
illocutionary acts, which, as noted, does not preclude their being also of a strategic nature.  
 
Nacos (2007) offers the July 7, 2005, attack on the London transit system as an example of 
“attention and awareness” seeking, one of the four media-dependent objectives she identifies. The attack 
perpetrated by four British Muslims with ties to Al Qaeda, she says, was planned to coincide with the G8 
Summit meeting in Scotland and succeeded in eclipsing the news about the Summit. This sort of media 
coverage, intentionally or not, lends a certain legitimacy to terrorists just by covering them. It is not 
necessarily legitimacy, however, that terrorists seek, but a recognition that they, and their cause, need to 
be taken into account. Therefore, often in the context of repeated terrorist actions over extended periods 
of time, terrorists simply may be saying, “We are still here, the issue has not been resolved, something 
must be done.” 
 
Revenge 
 
The next two categories in our typology are revenge and puncturing complacent complicity. 
Although both involve moral condemnation, the latter is considerably more subtle. Moral condemnation 
rhetorically reframes the past in a moral register that positions the targets of attack as perpetrators of a 
wrong. Simple revenge is the more direct form, based on a primitive and fairly universal understanding of 
justice as rendering just reprisal. It is supposed that when a wrong has been done, what is deserved is 
retribution, the “eye for an eye” that communicates the lesson that one cannot get away with such acts. 
Revenge is not just any harm delivered to a foe, but one that is to be understood as connected to and 
merited by the foe’s previous action. It is in the harm’s message of justice done and balance restored that 
revenge constitutes moral condemnation. It is also for that reason that for revenge to be truly 
communicated, it must be clear either in itself or by an explicit assumption of responsibility who delivered 
the blow. 
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Examples abound of terrorist actions motivated by revenge. According to an Associated Press 
report on the Oklahoma City bombing, Timothy McVeigh explained his attack on the federal building as 
motivated to avenge government sieges at Waco and Ruby Ridge (Thompson, 2001). Similarly, according 
to at least one of the terrorists, revenge was at the heart of the actions taken in the London transit attack. 
 
I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our drive and 
motivation doesn’t come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer. Our 
religion is Islam, obedience to the one true God and following the footsteps of the final 
prophet messenger. Your democratically-elected governments continuously perpetuate 
atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you 
directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my 
Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security you will be our targets and until you 
stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this 
fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this 
situation. (“London Bomber,” 2005, paras. 5–11) 
 
Several things are going on in the above passage. Although certainly the terrorist is speaking about the 
puncturing of complicity, his emphasis also is on retaliation. Justice is framed as reprisal for previous and 
ongoing wrongdoing, and further action is promised under the banner of revenge. 
 
The above case illustrates a point we made earlier—that sometimes the accompanying rhetoric 
from the terrorist is necessary for interpreting the act. Without it, the illocutionary force of the act may 
not get through to its intended audience. Bringing London’s transit system to a halt and the ensuing fear 
for commuters could be seen as an attempt at disrupting governability, and revenge may not be clear. 
Again, it is this dissonance or mixed message that contributes to terrorism as failed political 
communication. 
 
Puncturing Complacent Complicity 
 
As mentioned, in the London bomber’s quest for revenge, there is a desire as well to puncture 
complacent complicity. What do we mean by this designation? Simple revenge is directed at actors who 
already know that they have done something to the retaliating party. Simple revenge is thus generally 
understood as such even if its legitimacy is not granted.  
 
It can happen, however, that those who have done wrong are in denial about the wrong or are 
otherwise oblivious to their responsibility for it. This obliviousness is most typical in the case of collective 
actions where the members of a society authorize their leaders to act without taking any further 
responsibility for what those leaders do. As Thoreau recognized, merely by conducting business as usual in 
a society, one enables and perpetuates the collective sins of that society. It was for that reason Thoreau 
penned his essay on civil disobedience and spent a night in jail. Those who consider themselves victims of 
the society’s transgressions, however, are likely to be less passive. Part of what they may morally 
condemn is the complacent complicity of ordinary citizens who feel no compunction or responsibility for 
what their government is doing to others.  
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Making those ordinary citizens the target of attack is, then, an essential part of the point. The 
illocutionary act here is the accusation to the target citizenry that they are complicit in their government’s 
actions, while the intended perlocutionary effect is the puncturing of this type of complacency. As the 
Muslim terrorists quoted above say in effect, “you putatively innocent civilians are being attacked because 
you are not innocent, and in fact have attacked us first; you have an obligation to do something.” 
 
Most notoriously, it was ostensibly an effort to puncture the complacent complicity of Americans 
that motivated the 2001 September 11 attack on the World Trade Center by Osama Bin Laden and his Al 
Qaeda organization. Certainly, the Twin Towers were a symbol of U.S. might and the American way of life. 
Their destruction was meant to deliver a message.  
 
What Bin Laden says suggests an intention to puncture just this complacent complicity. “Why are 
we fighting and opposing you?” Bin Laden asks in his open letter “To the Americans” (Lawrence, 2005). 
The answer, he says, “is very simple: Because you attacked us and continue to attack us. You attacked us 
in Palestine” (ibid., p. 162). He then lists various ways in which the United States supported the Israeli 
oppression of the Palestinian people. Bin Laden continues: 
 
You attacked us in Somalia, you supported the Russian atrocities against us in 
Chechnya, the India oppression against us in Kashmir, and the Jewish aggression 
against us in Lebanon. Under your supervision, consent, and orders the governments of 
our countries, which act as your collaborators, attack us on a daily basis. (ibid., p. 163) 
 
There follows another list. How, though, does Bin Laden justify an attack on civilians? As follows: 
 
You may then dispute that all the above does not justify aggression against civilians, for 
crimes they did not commit and offenses in which they did not participate: This 
argument contradicts your continuous repetition that America is the land of freedom, 
and freedoms leaders in this world. If this is so, the American people are the ones who 
chose their government through their own free will; a choice which stems from their 
agreement to its policies. Thus the American people have chosen. . . . The American 
people are the ones who pay the taxes which fund the planes that bomb us in 
Afghanistan, the tanks that strike and destroy our homes in Palestine, the armies which 
occupy our lands in the Arabian Gulf, and the fleets which ensure the blockade of 
Iraq. . . . This is why the American people cannot be innocent of all the crimes 
committed by the Americans and Jews against us. . . . Thus, if we are attacked, then we 
have the right to strike back. (ibid.,, p. 165) 
 
What Bin Laden articulates here is an account of collective responsibility very much convergent with 
Thoreau’s. Although we support neither the act nor Bin Laden’s justification, the attack on U.S. civilian 
institutions is framed as a communication to the American people, a communication that condemns them 
as complacently complicit in the actions of their government. If so, the act cannot be really understood 
without considering this communicative component.  
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Complacent complicity may be punctured without its simultaneously being an act of revenge. 
Arguably falling in this category are the “direct action campaigns” of groups such as the Animal Liberation 
Front and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), which include the intentional destruction of animal testing labs; 
intimidation of scientists, pharmaceutical executives, and their families; and endangering the safety of 
loggers. It is not revenge these groups are seeking, because they have not been personally wronged. 
Rather, they are trying to puncture the complacent complicity of workers and the broader public in the 
violation of the earth or animal rights. The element of moral condemnation is evident in, for example, 
ELF’s admonition to Boise Cascade after the group attacked the logging company’s regional headquarters 
in Monmouth, Oregon: “Let this be a lesson to all greedy multinational corporations who don’t respect 
their ecosystems. The elves are watching” (Rosebraugh, 2004, p. 94). Arguably, it was also a case of 
moral condemnation without revenge when an extreme antiabortionist shot and killed Dr. George Tiller, a 
practitioner of late-term abortions, while he was serving as an usher in church (Stumpe & Davey, 2009). 
 
Why Terrorism Fails as a Form of Political Communication 
 
If war is politics by other means, the same can be said of terrorism. When terrorist acts are 
meant to be communicative, they represent a form of political communication. Terrorism as political 
communication does not always fail. One reason it does not always or totally fail is because, as a 
communication, terrorism is complex, dynamic, and addressed to multiple audiences. One major audience, 
as Hadis (2007) observes, is the larger in-group from which the terrorism arises. Terrorist acts can 
reinforce in-group mythology and narratives and in this way, as in the case of ISIS, serve as a recruiting 
tool. It also may be that when audiences begin to wonder whether terrorists are freedom fighters, as in 
the debate about the National Liberation Front in 1950s Algeria, the terrorist’s communication has been 
successful to some extent. Similarly, some people see Palestinian acts of terrorism as a legitimate 
response to Israel’s occupation of their land.  
 
Our focus, however, is on those cases, more frequent, in which terrorism does fail as political 
communication. To understand terrorism as failed political communication, we first need to go back to 
Habermas’ (1981) distinction between strategic and communicative action. According to Habermas, 
communicative action, even when there is a strategic goal, is aimed at and depends on mutual 
understanding. When that understanding fails, so does the communication.  
 
Why, in the case of terrorism, does mutual understanding routinely fail? There are several 
reasons, the first coming out of the rhetorical literature on social protest. Whereas communication is 
routinely thought to be linguistic, terrorism belongs to those symbolic acts that express thought without 
language. Rhetoricians of social protest address such confrontational discourse as a dimension of political 
communication and, more importantly, consider why this approach is often marked by failure. In 
particular, as a symbolic act, terrorism belongs to what Cathcart (2006) and Scott and Smith (2006) 
speak of as the “rhetoric of confrontation” and Windt (2006) of diatribe as “the last resort of protest.” 
Both the rhetoric of confrontation generally and diatribe in particular operate within a “moral arena” 
(Cathcart, 2006, p. 95) in which each side sees itself locked in a Manichean struggle. In this context, 
confrontation is a “symbolic display” (p. 96) or, as Cathcart further puts it, “a dramatization created by 
the forced juxtaposing of two agents, one standing for the evil, erroneous system, and the other 
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upholding the new or ‘perfect’ order” (p. 101). As such, what confrontation calls for is “a moral response 
appropriate to the moral accusation communicated by the act of confrontation” (p. 101).  
 
If, as we suggest, communicative terrorism is just such an act of moral confrontation, then it fails 
to communicate for much the same reason as Windt (2006) says diatribe fails. According to Windt, 
diatribe is the opposite of ordinary persuasive communication. In ordinary communication, ethos or 
credibility are established “by drawing upon the beliefs of the audience . . . by not offending traditional 
beliefs or feelings” (p. 63). The diatribe rejects this strategy as moral compromise. Instead, Windt says, 
the major purpose of diatribe is to shock, and to shock by advancing a countermorality that positions the 
audience as morally culpable. To accept that message as sent, however, the audience needs to accept 
that it is, in fact, morally culpable. As Windt observes, however, lambasting an audience and trashing its 
values is not the best way to convince an audience of anything. 
 
The same is true with terrorism. As a political communication, terrorism is an act of moral 
confrontation that demands moral response. As we have demonstrated, as a communicative act terrorism 
is often meant to signal retribution for a prior moral offense or a more general moral condemnation. To 
accept the message, the audience must accept that it is not only morally culpable but so culpable as 
deserving of violent response.  
 
Violence is not an effective teacher. There is a natural reluctance to accept rebuke in any form, 
however gently it is presented. When that rebuke takes the form of violence, it is much easier to regard it 
as malicious and unjustified. When communicating one’s grievances this way, one’s voice is inevitably 
delegitimized and any valid content all but lost. After being targeted by terrorists, for example, the 
complacently complicit do not suddenly recognize themselves as such. 
 
The oppositional logic of terrorism as a rhetorical form is only part of the reason that it fails; 
other factors come in to play. The more complex the embedded message, the more likely the 
communication to fail. Thus, acts aimed at puncturing complacent complicity are more likely than acts of 
revenge or reprisal to be misunderstood. Even reprisal however, is often misunderstood as such, 
particularly when reprisals are traded back and forth ad infinitum, as in the case of the Palestinians and 
Israelis. In such cases, each out-group’s act of terror appears more as a new provocation rather than a 
response to the in-group’s earlier act of terror, which was itself a response to the out-group’s previous act 
of terror.  
 
These problems are compounded by still others. Participants in a dialogue must attend to the 
dialogue in order for communication to take place. We are better at understanding communications that 
come from within and that follow the rules of our own culture (Hofstede, 1983; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 
1973). Terrorism comes from outside and from contexts that are little understood by the intended 
audience. Acts of terror often tend to be communications across geography, culture and ideology 
(Crelinstin, 2002), which interact in a way that leaves the ultimate receiver without the context to 
understand or interpret the message. It is not necessarily physical distance that matters here but 
awareness of what one’s government is doing elsewhere.  
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Without this context, the communication sent is in need of interpretation. Interpretation itself is a 
privileged act; those who have hegemonic control interpret situations in a way that best serves their 
interests. The mass media and the government on the receiving end of a terrorist act are the agents that 
typically decode such acts by prioritizing certain interpretations over other possible versions. 
Governments—and in the United States, particularly the president—generally provide the default frame in 
terms of which terrorist acts are understood (Entman, 1993, 2003; Gitlin, 2003; Tuman, 2010).  
 
Governments have a vested interest in reading terrorist acts in ways that privilege their own 
interests and ideologies over those of the terrorists. The media, in turn, tend to favor the explanations of 
the home government. According to the indexing model of press–state relations, the press will dissent 
from an administration’s framing only if it finds some dissension within the ranks of elite opinion (Bennett, 
1990). According to Entman’s (2003, 2004) newer cascade model, after the Cold War, the U.S. press has 
become more willing to challenge administration framing even in the absence of elite dissension, but only, 
as in the case of the Abu Ghraib scandals, where government actions seem markedly to contradict U.S. 
character (Porpora, Nikolaev, Hagemann May, & Jenkins, 2013). Because terrorist attacks do not involve 
any such contradictions, the government’s frame is likely to prevail.  
 
These various threats to the success of terrorist communication can be observed in the 
September 11 attack on the World Trade Center and the U.S. Pentagon. In addition to other possible 
reasons, Al Qaeda’s September 11 act of terrorism failed because it was violent; because the American 
people had little awareness of the group’s grievances; because it was a complex communication; and 
because the U.S. government effectively framed the issue in a way that totally sidelined what Osama Bin 
Laden ostensibly meant to communicate. The September 11 attack was not just violent, it was 
experienced by a traumatized U.S. public as abhorrent, meaningless violence. As suggested, that violence 
made a poor teacher. To the American people it seemed utterly gratuitous. Most Americans had never 
heard of Al Qaeda and had no idea about the group’s grievances.  
 
Further, the attack’s embedded communicative content—puncturing complacent complicity—is 
the most complex in our typology, demanding more understanding from its audience than mere revenge. 
September 11 was thus precisely a case, in which to be successful, the communicative act needed to be 
accompanied by actual discursive rhetoric. Yet most Americans still have never heard Bin Laden’s own 
rationale, quoted earlier, for the September 11 attacks. Americans’ understanding has instead been 
principally formed by President George W. Bush’s September 11 speech and his reiterations thereafter 
that the attack was launched by “evil-doers” who simply sought to strike against the “greatest beacon of 
freedom and opportunity in the world” (“Text of Bush’s Address,” 2001).  
 
Even beyond Bush’s September 11 speech, the Bush administration’s frame continued to carry 
the day. The major rhetorical device used was what has been called the paranoid style of politics (see 
Hofstater, 1966; Porpora, et al., 2013), which in this case emphasized an apocalyptic scenario ending with 
an entire U.S. city up in smoke (Smith, 2005). The press did little to counter the administration’s frame 
(Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2007). The few U.S. voices, like that of Barack Obama’s former pastor 
Jeremiah Wright, who saw September 11 as America’s “chickens coming home to roost,” were definitively 
marginalized. In the end, few Americans received the message Bin Laden said he was trying to send—that 
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Americans were complacently complicit in the oppression of Muslims throughout the world. If it was Al 
Qaeda’s intent to force Americans to rethink U.S. foreign policy, the communication can only be described 
as failed.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Examining terrorism as more than just an act of violence expands our repertoire of 
understanding and response. It allows us to see past the illegitimate violence to the possibly 
legitimate message behind it. In his book, Talking to Terrorists, Mark Perry emphasizes the 
importance of understanding such acts as political communication: 
 
Jeff Aronson . . . put it this way: “We have to come to terms with a disturbing and blunt 
truth and finally face it—that after 9/11 a segment of our planet celebrated. We cannot 
simply pass it off; we cannot ignore it. We have to face it.” We cannot simply condemn 
that celebration as the work of people who “do not share our values.” We must find out 
why they celebrated. (Perry, 2010, p. 213) 
 
Acknowledging such a point is not to justify terrorism, and we emphasize that we do not think 
that terrorism is ever justified. However, recognizing terror as a communicative act signals us that 
something may have been communicated to which we should attend. It can help us overcome 
ethnocentrism to understand a geographically and/or culturally disparate group. If violence is understood 
only as violence, then violent retribution seems the only appropriate response. Understanding any act of 
terrorism through a communicative lens allows for a more dynamic and nuanced response. 
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